cloudtaser's eBPF agent gains BPF LSM hooks as the synchronous deny path for the five highest-risk kernel entry points:
ptrace_access_check,
file_open (covering
/proc/pid/environ and
/proc/pid/mem),
bpf (unauthorised program loads),
socket_sendmsg (secret-buffer exfiltration), and
kernel_load_data. By LSM design, the hook fires synchronously before the kernel action completes. On kernels without
CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y or where
bpf is absent from
/sys/kernel/security/lsm (some hardened distros, GKE pre-1.27, AKS Mariner), the agent detects this at startup and falls back to the well-tested kprobe enforcement path. No operator configuration change required. The LSM code merged across cloudtaser-ebpf
#183,
#185,
#190,
#193 and is rolling out in the next tagged release; per-kernel runtime confirmation lands once
cloudtaser-pipeline#227 unblocks full-matrix BPF verifier validation.